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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED: 
Title 59, Chapter 24: Tax Court Act 
Section 1, Subsection 1: 
CDThere is created a tax division m each of the 
district courts of the State of Utah which shall hove 
exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from and petitions 
for review of decisions by the state tax commission 
rendered after formal hearings before the commission. 
Title 5S, Chapter 31: Jeopardy 
Section 7, Subsection 1: 
CI) If a taxpayer fails to file any return required 
pursuant to Title 59 within SO days of the time 
prescribed, the state tax commision may petition for a 
writ of mandate to compel the taxpayer to file the 
return. The petition may be filed, in the discretion of 
the tax commission, in the tax court of the third 
judicial district or in the district court for the 
county in which the taxpayer resides or has his 
principal place of business. In the case of a 
nonresident taxpayer the petition shall be filed in the 
third district court. 
The court shall grant a hearing on the petition for 
a writ of mandate within 20 days after the filing of the 
petition or as soon thereafter as the court may 
determine, having regard for the rights of the parties 
and the necessity of a speedy determination of the 
petition. 
Upon a finding of failure to file a return within 
60 days of the time prescribed pursuant to Title 59, the 
court shall issue a writ of mandate requiring the 
tavpayer to file a return. The order of the court shall 
include an award of attorneys' fees, court costs, 
witness fees and all other costs in favor of the 
prevailing party. 
UTAH RULES 0£ CIUIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(A) Scope of rules: 
These rules shall govern the procedure in the 
Supreme Court, the district courts,city courts, and 
Justice courts in the State of Utah, in all 
actions,suits and proceedings of a civil nature, whether 
cognizable at law or in equity, and in all statutory 
proceedings, except as stated in Rule Bl. They shall be 
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action. 
RULE 4. PROCESS 
Ca) Issuance of Summons. 
The summons may be signed and issued by the 
plaintiff or his attorney. A summons shall be deemed to 
have issued when placed in the hands of a qualified 
person for the purpose of sevice. Separate summonses 
may be issued and served. 
Cb) Time of Issuance and Service. 
If an action is commenced by the filing of a 
complaint, summons must issue thereon within three 
mantfaa ££Sffl the. date of. such filing. The summons must 
be served within one year after the filing of the 
complaint or the action will be deemed dismissed, 
provided that in any action brought against two or more 
defendants in which personal service has been obtained 
upon one of them within the year, the other or others 
may be served or appear any time before trial. 
Cc) Contents of Summons. 
The summons shall contain the name of the court, 
the names or designations of the parties to the action, 
the county in which it is brought, be directed to the 
defendant, state the time within which the defendant is 
required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall 
notify him that in case of his failure to do so, 
judgment by default will be rendered against him. If 
the summons be served without a copy of the complaint, 
or by publication, it shall briefly state the sum of 
money or other relief demanded, and in case of 
publication of summons such summons as published shall 
contain a description of the subject matter or res 
involved in the action, Uihere the summons is served 
without a complaint, it shall note therein that a copy 
of said complaint will be served upon or mailed to 
defendant within ten days after such service or that if 
the address of defendant is unknown, the complaint will 
be filed with the clerk of the court within ten days 
after such service. 
Rule B4A. PREJUDGEMENT WRITS 
C5) At the hearing on the issue of the writ or its 
continuance, the proponent of the writ shall have the 




I M COURT JURISDICTION 
Mr. Miller, Assistant Attorney General and counsel for 
the State Tax Commission, claims difficulty in following my 
arguments (Respondent' s Brief, P 12). I appologise if I have 
been unclear, because I want very much to be understood for 
my issues and arguments are valid. I rather suspect that fir. 
fliller understands better than he would have one believe, but 
using confusion as an excuse, he rewrite^the arguments into 
something he can successfully argue against, and proceeds to 
attack those rewritten issues. A prime example of this is 
found in the order issued by the Tax Court during the hearing 
on August 9, 1985 as quoted in the Respondent's brief on page 
6. This order was prepared by fir. fliller and presented to the 
Judge before the hearing. I was never given opportunity to 
review it for accurateness before it was signed by the judge. 
It flagrantly misstates my arguments in both points 1 & 2 
becausfc I have never challenged the constitutionality of the 
statutes, but rather the application of those statutes by the 
State Tax Commission (hereinafter referred to as the STC3. 
In order that there may be no more misunderstanding the 
issues, let me state clearly: I do not challenge the 
authority of the District Court to inforce writs of mandate, 
for they clearly have power to so do! I concur completely 
with this court in its ruling in the Loaney case, concerning 
district court Jurisdiction, as cited in the Respondent's 
Brief at 15. Furthermore, I do not challenge the authority of 
the Tax Court to issue writs of mandate in situations where 
it has Jurisdiction, as specifically granted by the 
legislative act which created it C59-S4-1 UCA3 . Lastly, I do 
not "simply ignore" the language used in section 59-31-7, but 
have read and analyzed those paragraphs extensively and 
contend that the intent of the legislature is best understood 
through the words of the act. I have confidence that our 
legislators are very proficient in the construction and use 
of the English language, and that when they use the word 
"exclusive", they intend it to convey the meaning as commonly 
accepted. Such common acceptance is properly verified by 
consulting a well established dictionary such as Webster's 
New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Appellant's Brief, P 113. 
Mr. Miller cites no such authority in reaching the apparent 
definition he is attempting to apply, but simply says that 
the meaning is "obvious" *C Respondent's Brief at 143. What is 
apparently so "obvious" to fir. Miller escaped the meticulous 
Mr. Webster and his staff. 
UCA 59-31-7 is basicly a straight forward simple 
statute. If one allows the words and phrases to carry their 
commonly accepted meaning, it is easy to see that this 
statute is principally directed to the STC, and is to be 
applied only to "taxpayers". Said section mentions three 
different courts in which a petition for writ of mandate may 
be filed: the Tax Court of the Third Judicial District, the 
District Court for the county in which the taxpayer resides, 
and the Third District Court. The commission is directed to 
use its "discretion" in applying the facts and circumstances 
of each case to determine the proper court in which to file 
said petition. It is my contention that the commission 
errored on at least three counts when applying this section 
in instant case. First, that they are attempting to apply it 
against one who is not a "taxpayer" (this error will be 
addressed under point #4, Evidence). Secondly, they are 
attempting to apply an extraordinary, special procedure 
legislatively designed for jeopardy situations, without 
jeopardy being alledged nor proven (this error will be 
addressed in point #3, Jeopardy). Thirdly, they errored in 
selecting the proper court in which to file their petition 
for writ of mandate. 
Uhen a District Court Judge sits in the legislatively 
created Tax Court,he is limited by the "Tax Court Act" CS9-24 
UCA) to the position of an appellate court judge, not the 
Judge of a court of origional Jurisdiction like the District 
Court. The Tax Court of any Judicial district is not the 
District Court of that Judicial district, nor is the District 
Court the Tax Court, but they are two distinct and seperate 
courts, each with its own powers, grants, and scope of 
jurisdiction. 
Perhaps a couple of pertinente questions and their 
answers will aid in seeing this distinction. First, if the 
Tax Court of the Third Judicial District is simply a district 
court Judge to whom all tax related issues are assigned, why 
did it take a legislative act to create it? A simple 
categorizing of cases could have been accomplished by the 
district court itself through its own case assignment 
process. The answer to this question is clearly that the 
Legislature had more in mind than Just a categorizing of 
cases. Secondly, before the passage of The Tax Court Act 
(59-24 UCA) in 1977, what court had appelate jurisdiction 
over "...appeals from and petitions for review of decisions 
by the state tax commission..."? Was it the District Courts? 
No it was not! Before the passage of said Tax Court Act this, 
the Supreme Court of the state, had such Jurisdiction. This 
is indicated by the fact that the State Tax Commission Code 
of Administrative Procedure in sections 1-1C13D and 8-1 still 
refer to this, the Supreme Court, as the proper court of 
appeal from Commission decisions CR-85,R-94). Obviously the 
legislature created the Tax Courts of the various Judicial 
districts for the purpose of relieving this the Utah Supreme 
Court of some of its case burden by creating an interum forum 
for resolving some of the issues. The District Courts have 
never had appelate jurisdiction of appeals from State Tax 
Commission decisions, nor do they now have such Jurisdiction. 
Likewise, the Tax Court has never had, nor does it now have 
general, origional Jurisdiction over all tax issues, but has 
"...exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from and petitions 
for review of decisions by the State Tax Commission rendered 
after formal hearings before the commission.". Here is the 
point of my arguement: since the Tax Court is "exclusively" 
an appelate court, it is barred, by the statute creating it, 
from hearing instant case which comes as an origional action 
cammensed by the State Tax Commission, not an appeal from any 
of their decisions! 
POINT #E 
SUMMONS AND SERUICE D£ PROCESS 
The basic arguments of insufficient service of process 
were well briefed in the Appellant's Brief and need no 
explanation here. However I will make two observations 
concerning the STC arguments on this point before moving on: 
First, Mr.Miller states that this is a "...legislatively 
authorized special action that is not therefore subsumed 
within the ordinary or usual civil actions described in Rule 
3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (Respondent's Brief 
P. 16). It is a fact that this is a legislatively authorized 
special action, but fir. Miller failed to notice that Rule 1 
RCP states that "These rules shall govern the procedure in... 
al} statutory proceedings,.."Cemphasis added). The only 
logical situation where a short-cut could be justified is in 
emergency situations where time is critical and action must 
be taken to prevent an irreconcilable loss from occurring. A 
condition of Jeopardy would be that type of situation and 
that is why the writ of mandate is found in the jeopardy 
section of the code. But of course, that is the subject of 
Point #3. 
Second we come to the absurd conclusion by the STC that 
since this court didn't raise the summons issue, sua sponte, 
in the Looney case, it is an unavailing argument in this case 
(Respondent's Brief P. 17). Such reasoning fails to hold 
water because if Mr. Looney didn't raise the issue in the 
District Court or on appeal, this court is under no 
obligation to rule on it of its own initiative. I suspect 
that Mr. Miller brings this point out, not so much for the 
merits of the point itself, but more in an attempt to 
convince the court, through many references, that this case 
is identical to the Looney case. The facts of the matter are 
that this case is substantially different from the Looney 
* 
case as will be pointed out in Point #4, and deserves to be 
examined on its own merit and not tainted by cases that are 
similar in subject matter, but very different in facts and 
circumstances. 
This is a prime example of fir. fliller's cunning 
application of the sophistic art of his profession. He tries 
to lead this court from assumed facts and rephrased 
arguments, under color of law, to mistaken conclusions. 
POINT #3 
UCft 59-31-7. JEOPARDY 
Mr. Miller argues that the "...validity of section 
59-31-7 does not depend upon any particular location in the 
Utah Code."(Respondent's Brief P IB). I agree, but at the 
same time I contend that the location has a great deal to do 
with how a validly authorized statute is to be applied. The 
issue at hand is proper application, not the validity or 
constitutionality of the statute. Continuing on, Mr. fliller 
contends that "...the title of Title 59 chapter 30 is not 
law. It is merely a general identification of the provisions 
which follow."CRespondent's Brief P IB). Again I agree,and 
further add that the same applies to Title 59 Chapter 31, 
* 
which is the section being examined here. Said Title and 
Chapter generally identifies all of the provisions which 
follow as having to do with termination and jeopardy 
assessment procedure of revenue and taxation. 
tlr Miller also seems to infer that the location of any 
particular statute within the code has no bearing on its 
scope and application. With this argument, I must 
emphatically disagree. If it were so, financial institutions 
may be liable for the provisions under Title 4 Utah 
Agricultural Code, or perhaps hotel keepers would be bound by 
Title 40 Mines and Mining. Such a situation is Just not 
reasonable and needs no further argument. 
Before leaving this point I must air two questions: 
First, while it is agreed that formalistic rules of grammar 
should not be controlling, how is one to know what the 
"intent of the legislature" is on any statute except by the 
words and location within the code of said statute? Second, 
if this writ of mandate proceeding is indeed a "special 
procedure" which allows extraordinary legal measures, then 
what are the extraordinary circumstances which warrant such 
measures? 
I contend that the legislature knew precisely what it 
was doing, and that they deliberately placed the writ of 
mandate under chapter 31 UCA, intending it to be used only 
under situations of jeopardy. Furthermore, I contend that 
jeopardy is a special circumstance which would merit the use 
of an extraordinary writ, but where no such special 
circumstance exists, and no irreconcilable damage will result 
unless immediate action is taken, the extraordinary writ of 
mandate is improper,and unjustifiable! 
POINT m 
SUFFICIENCY D£ EUIDENCE 
Of the four points argued in this Reply Brief, this 
issue is the most important! It is not limited to the 
question of whether the court had sufficient evidence before 
it to enter a writ of mandate, but is the broader issue of 
sufficiency of evidence for verifying a petition or proving 
Jurisdiction. Mr. Miller claims that it is not a 
jurisdictional argument, when in fact it goes to the very 
root of jurisdiction. If this person received no "income", 
then he cannot be be construed to be a "taxpayer". If he is 
not a "taxpayer", then 59-31-7 UCA, uihich is specifically 
directed to taxpayers only, cannot be applied to him and no 
court can gain jurisdiction over him through said statute. 
Mr.Miller, in his zealous attempt to prosecute me has 
taken some of my statements, stretched them to the extreme 
and claimed that distorted version to be "overwhelmingly 
conclusive evidence" of "income" (Respondent's Brief P. 113. 
He erroneously concludes that since I state that I "work", I 
must of necessity be the recipient of "income". Such 
reasoning is ridiculous! Take for example, my recent 
situation of incarceration in the Salt Lake County Jail. I 
"worked" even in there; I swept and mopped floors, washed the 
tables, sinks, toilets,and showers, but I very seriously 
doubt that "income" will ever result from said work. It is 
also interesting to note that I survived quite well in there 
despite having received no "income"! As I have stated before, 
I do not work for, nor seek after, gain or profit (income). 
Nevertheless, I do work almost every day, in fact I am 
working right now as I am preparing this brief, but again no 
income will result from this work. 
fir. Miller further states: "...when Mr. Iverson 
categorically denied receipt of substance for services, he 
contradicted several statements in his "Uerified Statement of 
Refutation"" (Respondent's Brief P. 233. This statement is a 
brazen misrepresentation of the facts. Nowhere in said 
"Uerified Statement of Refutation" do I state that I perform 
"services", nor that I receive substance for services I Let me 
emphatically state here that I do not perform services For 
substance, because services can only be performed by a 
servant for his master and I am not a servant to material 
substance. As I have previously stated I am a free and 
natural individual and have but one Master, my Creator! 
The STC has alledged that during the years 1979 through 
1982, I received income above a specified level which would 
require a duty to file a return but in all of the hearings on 
this case, there have been no definite figures accepted into 
the record as income. If by some stretch of the imagination 
my statements that I "work" and that I "deal on a cash 
basis", could be construed to be evidence of income, there is 
no indication of when and how much. To prove their 
allegations, the STC must be able to show that income above 
the statutory minimum was received during each of the years 
in question. Absent such proof, the issuance of a writ of 
mandate is improper. 
The STC argues that the Fifth Amendment Privilege 
against self-incrimination does not protect a taxpayer from 
disclosing the amount of his income (Respondent's Brief P, 
19). While this may be a valid point in some cases Csuch as 
the Jensen case as cited in the Respondent's brief addendum 
II), it is off point in the case at hand since I am not a 
"taxpayer" and have received no "income". I do not rely upon 
a "Fifth Amendment Privilege" granted by the State, but 
rather instead upon an inalienable right to privacy granted 
by my Creator and guaranteed by both the United States 
Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
With respect to the argument that "Mr. Iverson's evasive 
and devious conduct... can be and was construed as an 
admission to the allegations of the petition."(Respondent's 
Brief P. El), I simply reply that such reasoning is clearly 
faulty and indicates that the STC is grabbing at straws in a 
desperate attempt to Justify the issuance of a writ of 
mandate. It is my position that I as an individual have an 
inalienable right to privacy. The Supreme Court of the United 
States has ruled that the individual owes no duty to the 
state to divulge his business or open his doors to 
investigation C Appellant's Brief P. 22, Hale vs Henkel, 201 
US 43 at p, 74). In the United States vs Johnson case the 
United States Supreme Court further ruled that: "the right 
against self-incrimination is neither accorded to the passive 
resistant, nor the person who is ignorant of hiss rights, not 
to one indifferent thereto. It is a fighting clause. Its 
benefits can be retained only by sustained combat. It cannot 
be claimed by an attorney or solicitor. It is valid only when 
insisted upon by a belligerent claimant in person" (United 
States vs Johnson, 76 F Supp 538 3 In the case at hand I am 
that "belligerent claimant in person" and I have and will 
continue to demand all of my rights, including my right to 
privacy, at all times! What fir. Miller Judges to be evasive 
and devious conduct is merely my efforts at insisting upon 
retaining my right to privacy. 
Perhaps the following examples will demonstrate the 
ridiculous nature of such conclusions: Uhen I go to the rest 
room to take care of natural body elimination, I like to 
close the door. I like my privacy in that situation, not 
because I am significantly different from any other male 
member of the human race and want to hide that difference, or 
because I am planning on doing anything that I am ashamed of. 
People outside that locked door may speculate that all kinds 
of wicked, awful, and terrible things are going on inside. 
They may be right and they may be wrong, but the mere fact 
that I insist on a closed and locked door while in the rest 
room is not proof of any such activity going on inside. 
Furthermore I will continue to insist that no one has the 
right to force me to open that door so that they may see what 
I do and criticise, analyze or discuss my activity. Similar 
situations arise when one encloses his yard with a high solid 
fence or constructs very private restriced places of worship, 
such as temples. Those outside immediately begin to speculate 
on what evil is being hidden, when most generally the only 
purpose for such enclosures and restrictions is for pure and 
simple privacy. I do not and will not willingly relinquish my 
right to privacy for it has been given to me by my creator. 
Without it, and my other God given rights, 1 cannot do what 
He expects of me! 
As is evident by the many references in the Respondent's 
Brief to the Looney and the Jensen case, Mr. rtiller considers 
them to be essentially identical to the case at hand, and 
relies heavily upon them. What he fails to notice, or perhaps 
intentionally ignores, is the fact that in both cases there 
was evidence and admissions of receipts of specific amounts 
over specific time periods. In fact Mr. Looney had wages from 
which income taxes had been withheld and for which there were 
W~2 forms on file (Respondent's Brief, Addendum I, P. 3). In 
Fir. Jensen's case there were exact amounts of earnings 
established for the years in question which showed amounts, 
each year, well above the statutory minimums for filing 
(Respondent's Brief, Addendum II, P. 23. In the case at bar, 
there is no such evidence, and that is why the STC is so 
upset with my insistance to retain my right to privacy. They 
would have me provide for them the evidence to prove their 
allegations. When I deny their allegations and choose to 
stand upon my right to privacy, as the belligerent claimant 
in person, they assume that I am trying to hide guilt and 
accuse me of obstruction of Justice saying that: "Mr. 
Iverson's wrongful conduct frustrated the orderly 
presentation of "evidence" in this case". They refuse to 
acknowledge that such evidence does not exist even though I 
have stated under oath that I received no income during the 
years in question. If they do not believe that statement, 
then how are they going to believe any of my statements. What 
then is gained by my being a witness? 
The purpose of my being called as a witness becomes 
obvious from the retrospective viewpoint, Since I had already 
given my testimony concerning the STC allegtions by denying 
essentially all of them, and since the STC had no evidence of 
their own to support them, fir. riiller sought to put me on the 
witness stand so that he, through crafty questioning, could 
expose some "discrepancy" showing that I am a bad person and 
therefore guilty. Such fallacious reasoning is a perfect 
example of the age old sophistic method of arguing called 
"ad-hominem" in which the real issues are forsaken and a full 
scale attack upon the character of the opponent is launched. 
i\opj.y wrier - Page 15 
Mr, Miller is hoping that if my character can be sufficiently 
shattered, the issues will no longer be valid. Such is not 
the case, because the issues are valid regardless of the 
nature of my character. It is my prayer that this court will 
look past all the mud slung at my character and Judge 
according to the facts and the law. 
CONCLUSION 
All of my issues are valid and deserve careful 
deliberation, each on its own merits. This court has not 
ruled on them previously and ought to take this opportunity 
to review the activities of the STC as compared to the 
directives given them by the Legislature. The strong-arm 
tactics currently used have little regard for the safeguards 
written into the statutes to protect the individual from 
governmental harrassment. This court should not permit a 
state agency to so abuse the power granted to it. 
The order of the Third District Tax Court should be 
summarily reversed. 
DATED this day of June, 1986. 
Clay K. Iverson 
Appellant in Proper Person 
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